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I. INTRODUCTION

This commentary is an enlargement of a talk delivered at the annual
conference of the Socio-Legal Studies Association (United Kingdom) held

in Bristol, England, in April 2001. The purpose was to raise questions
about where the "right-to-vote" comes from in the Florida and U.S.
Constitutions and whether the constitutional right-to-vote possesses useful
legal force in the judicial resolution of a closely-contested election. The
Gore-Bush Florida election controversy was the stimulus.
Among the subsidiary questions are: What should a written constitution
for a democratic government say about the right to vote? And, how, if at
all, should constitutional litigation play a role in adjudicating the outcomes
of elections regularly administered under the election laws? I am hesitant
to conclude that the celebrated 2000 United States presidential election especially the Florida episode - provides much guidance for other
constitutional democracies, except in terms of concrete defects to avoid.
With unmistakable clarity, the Florida experience revealed two points that

* Joseph W. Little is a Professor of Law at the Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law.
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a sound election system must be prepared to address:
1. Some elections may be so closely divided in vote totals that it is
impossible to determine a true winner except arbitrarily. In short, the
difference between the numbers of votes cast for the two leading
candidates may be less than the error rates in the balloting and vote
counting processes and machinery.'
This point conveys two sub-messages. First, the people should provide
themselves with balloting procedures and counting machinery possessing
the greatest accuracy and reliability they are willing to pay for.
Nevertheless, no matter how good the election machinery, errors will
occur, and constitutional exhortations cannot resolve disputes over vote
totals so narrowly divided as to be within the margin of error of the system
itself. Accordingly, a constitution might prudently prescribe that the results
of regularly conducted elections must be accepted. To that end, perhaps
this statement would serve:
The person receiving the most votes in the initial tabulation of votes
obtained by regular balloting and counting processes and machinery
in any election shall be elected in the absence ofmachinery failure or
fraud or other human misconduct in tabulating the votes.
In fact, this is essentially the argument Mr. Bush advanced in the Florida
election dispute. But, the Florida Constitution contains no plain statement
of that sort, and, in its absence, the Florida Supreme Court deemed itself
free to reject the argument, which it did.
The second issue to confront is:
2. If no such constitutional standard exists and the outcomes of closelydivided election tabulations are subject to judicial review, the election
laws must comprehensively address all elections whatever the dignity or
status of the office (i.e., from municipal council members to governors
or even national presidents). The laws should also designate an
administrative official with ample jurisdiction to resolve the entirety of
any dispute presented.
The 2000 Florida election laws were well designed to resolve disputes
arising in local, municipal, and county elections. What failed was the
application ofthe local resolution model to a statewide election embracing

1. See Alan Agresti & Brett Presnell, StatisticalIssues in the 2000 Presidential Election
in Florida, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117-33 (2001).
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many counties with separate election procedures and officials. Choosing
presidential electors is a statewide matter and the Florida elections laws, as
interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, proved inadequate to resolve the
Gore-Bush imbroglio efficiently.
The deficit was not in the jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court.
That court possesses ample jurisdiction and power to resolve any disputed
issue of law properly framed and submitted to it. What was lacking was an
adequate administrative framework and responsible official with authority
to treat all sixty-seven Florida counties as a unit. The Florida election
system is governed by a state constitution that places authority for
conducting all elections in elected county Supervisors of Elections.2 It
places administrative jurisdiction for resolving all election disputes at the
local level and provides no administrative mechanism for treating statewide
elections as a whole.3 While proven competent for many decades in
thousands of local elections, this mechanism failed in the extraordinary
statewide election of 2000. The result was the judicial quagmire that
captivated our nation and much of the world.
In short, Florida's laws and administration were inadequate in this
unprecedented main event. The reason is understandable enough. In terms
of the inherent fidelity, reliability, and capability of the voting and ballot
tabulating machinery in place, the Florida Gore-Bush election was a
statistical tie.' In short, the margin of difference between the total votes
tabulated and compiled for each ofthe two candidates was smaller than the
uncontrollable error rate in the balloting and counting machinery.5

2. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § I.

3. Section 102.1685 of the Florida Statutes does place judicial venue of statewide election
disputes in the circuit court of Leon County, Florida, but the laws then provide no practical
mechanism for bringing all county elections results into issue simultaneously.
4. See Agresti & Presnell, supra note 1.
5. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this factor as follows:
The closeness ofthis election, and the multitude of legal challenges which have
followed in its wake, have brought into sharp focus a common, if heretofore
unnoticed, phenomenon. Nationwide statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of
ballots cast do not register a vote for President for whatever reason, including
deliberately choosing no candidate at all or some voter error, such as voting for
two candidates or insufficiently marking a ballot. See Ho, More Than 2M Ballots
Uncounted, AP Online (Nov. 28,2000); Kelley, Balloting ProblemsNot Rare But
Only in a Very Close Election Do Mistakes and Mismarking Make a Difference,
Omaha World-Herald (Nov. 15, 2000). In certifying election results, the votes
eligible for inclusion in the certification are the votes meeting the properly
established legal requirements.
This case has shown that punchcard balloting machines can produce an
unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean, complete way
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Accordingly, no matter how many self-described impartial post facto
recounts are conducted, the numerical difference between the Gore and
Bush vote totals remains so small that no consensus of who was the true
winnerwill ever emerge. The Florida laws did not anticipate this result and
failed to provide an adequate arbitrary solution; at least, the Florida
Supreme Court refused to accept that they did.
The message for election laws is plain. In an election contest that
demands that a single person be selected to serve as winner, as in the
selection of the President of the United States of America, you might best
name as winner the person who winds up with at least one more vote than
the next in line on the basis of a single count of the votes. If this does not
satisfy, as it did not satisfy the Florida Supreme Court, then, as far as
fidelity to the people's choice is concerned, you might as well choose the
winner by the flip of a coin (or, as was once done somewhere, by a poker
game between the competitors). This would be quicker, cheaper, and even
surer than a more elaborate, but no more reliable system, such as the
Florida 2000 litigation.
In fact, the law of Florida does (or did) prescribe that the candidate with
one-more-vote wins.6 But, for close elections, the Florida law also provides
not a coin toss or poker game - but recounts and judicial contests. The
difficulty with these statutes is that they do not limit adjudication to testing
mere clerical and machinery errors, but also permit challenges to the
inherent fidelity of the balloting and vote-counting systems themselves, such
as the frenetic Gore-Bush attempts to secure that "one-more-vote" margin.
This is a prime example of de Tocqueville's early 19th century observation
that, in America, every political dispute, sooner or later, becomes a legal
dispute.7 The closeness of the race, and not any major deficiencies in the
laws themselves, created the context for this dispute.

by the voter. After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide
will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103-104 (2000).
6. FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2000) prescribing, in part:
The Elections Canvassing Commission shall, as soon as the official results are

compiled from all counties, certify the returns of the election and determine and
declare who has been elected for each office ....

If the county returns are not

received by the Department of State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an
election, all missing counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the
returns on file shall be certified.
Id.

7. 1 ALEXIS
trans., 1889).

DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA

96-103, 137-151 (Henry Reeve
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This fact occasions a return to the subject of embedding the "right-tovote" in a written constitution. Most people acquainted with the law of
written constitutions are familiar with the celebrated 1803 Marbury v.
Madison' decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Breaking with the British
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Marbury announced a new rule of
constitutional sovereignty: The written U.S. Constitution overrules
legislative enactments that conflict with constitutional dictates.9 Within
three years of Florida's having become the twenty-seventh state in the
Union in 1845, the Florida Supreme Court had applied the rule of
constitutional supremacy in Florida.° Thus, the groundwork for the 2000
Florida constitutional election crises was laid more than 150 years before.
A Florida election law appeared to resolve the contest on the seventh
day after the election" and a Florida Election Canvassing Commission was
prepared to apply it. Mr. Gore's partisans sued, claiming that to do this
would infringe upon some Florida citizens' constitutional "right-to-vote."
The constitutional question was thus raised; does either the Florida
Constitution or the United States Constitution explicitly guarantee Florida
citizens a "right-to-vote" for presidential electors? If so, how is that right
manifested in the documents? If the right does exist, may a candidate
invoke it to advance partisan interests in a closely divided election? And,
finally, may a candidate invoke the right, post-election, to test the inherent
reliability of vote casting and counting machinery? The 2000 Florida
election litigation attempted to answer these questions.
II. THE ISSUES
Shortly after the voting polls closed at 7:00 p.m. on November 7, 2000,
Messieurs Gore and Bush and their partisans commenced filing lawsuits in
Florida, raising numerous issues. Eventually, all these actions either
withered away, were rejected by the courts, or were made irrelevant in the
blaze of a late innings tag match between the Florida Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Florida, as in many states, voting on statewide issues is conducted by
local officials, county-by-county. These county officials prepare the ballots,
locally, count the votes, locally, and submit the county tallies to a state
agency called the Elections Canvassing Commission. 2 The laws also
prescribe that any county votes not reported to the Elections Canvassing

8. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

9. Id.
10. Flint River Steam Boat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848).
11. FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2000).
12. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 5. The members are the Governor, the Secretary
of State, and the director of the Division of Elections within the Department of State.
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Commission on the seventh day, post-election, are to be "ignored" and
excluded from the certified tabulations. 13 The Commission collects and
sums the county votes and certifies the winner on that seventh day. 4 Mr.
Gore challenged the regular application of this procedure.
To the Florida Supreme Court, Mr. Gore's challenge framed this issue:
Is the Elections Canvassing Commission legally bound to follow the plain
mandates of the Florida elections laws and certify a winner on the seventh
day? Or, must it ignore those mandates because of some superseding
provision or tenet in the Florida Constitution? Mr. Bush maintained that the
Commission was bound to apply the statutes faithfully, as written. By
contrast, Mr. Gore advanced the position that right-to-vote tenets of the
Florida Constitution bound the Commission to ignore the statutes, follow
an ad hoc procedure, include late-arriving votes from court-ordered
recounts, and then certify a winner.
The Florida Supreme Court generally accepted Mr. Gore's arguments,
directed the Elections Canvassing Commission to ignore the statute
temporarily, and set a massive statewide vote recount into play. 5 From the
various rulings of the Florida Supreme Court, Mr. Bush, in his turn,
invoked the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court to place the Florida
decisions under the scrutiny of the U.S. Constitution.
Comprehending the ensuing tussle between the Florida Supreme Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court requires a more sophisticated understanding
of United States federalism than most observers possess or care about. At
one point in the to-and-fro, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to be
captivated by an arcane point of constitutional federalism and jurisdiction,

13. Id. This statute, plus this statement in section 102.112(1) of the Florida Statutes; "If the

returns are not received by the department by the time specified, such returns may be ignored and
the results on file at that time may be certified by the department," created confusion in the mind
of the Florida Supreme Court. To resolve the confusion, the Florida court held that "may be
ignored" language found in section 102.112(1) of the Florida Statutes qualified the "shall be
ignored" language of the preceding statutory section, as follows:
Second, it also is well-settled that when two statutes are in conflict, the more
recently enacted statute controls the older statute. In the present case, the
provision in section 102.111 stating that the Department "shall" ignore returns
was enacted in 1951 as part of the Code. On the other hand, the penalty provision
in section 102.112 stating that the Department "may" ignore returns was enacted
in 1989 as a revision to chapter 102. The more recently enacted provision may
be viewed as the clearest and most recent expression of legislative intent.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1234 (Fla. 2000), vacated by
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
14. FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2000).
15. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
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but, inthe end, more-or-less abandoned it.'6 Instead, the U.S. Supreme
Court finally put an abrupt stop to the Gore-Bush recount in Mr. Bush's
favor, and did so on a curious U.S. constitutional right-to-vote basis, one
which is entirely different from the basis of the Florida Supreme Court's
decision.' In short, the resolution of the Florida election dispute finally
came down to a contest between two rights-to-vote: the one found in the
Florida Constitution by the Florida Supreme. Court, and another found in
the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In its opening right-to-vote sally, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the Florida constitutional right-to-vote could be vindicated only by
conducting vote recounts throughout the state.' Then, in a preemptive
counter-stroke, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal constitutional
right-to-vote could be vindicated only by stopping the recount. 9 Under the
supremacy tenet of U.S. federalism," the federal right-to-vote trumped and
neutralized the Florida right-to-vote. Thus ended the vote recounts and the
election. A puzzled observer might reasonably inquire, "How could two
constitutional rights-to-vote lead to exactly contradictory conclusions?"

III. THE PLAIN

WORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS

Because both Supreme Courts made their Gore-Bush decisions on
constitutional "right-to-vote" grounds, one might well inquire, "What
exactly do these Constitutions prescribe on this subject?" Examining the
texts may prove a disappointment.
Neither instrument includes a bold, inclusive statement such as, "Every
person shall have a right to vote in all public elections within any
jurisdiction in which the person is a citizen and resident and has qualified
to vote." Nevertheless, both Constitutions do include multiple provisions
that permit an inference that the right-to-vote is an implied right of
citizenship. Most cogent is the Florida Constitution's predicate that "All
16. This was the jurisdictional question raised by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76-78 (2000). This point is touched

upon lightly below.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.

98, 104, 109 (2000). This decision is discussed briefly below.
2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
98 (2000).
2. This provides that,

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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political power is inherent in the people."'" That power is manifested
through the exercise ofthe franchise. Numerous other provisions imply the
same right.2

21. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
22. Pertinent provisions of the Florida Constitution include:
ARTICLE 1. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

§ 1. Political power
All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.
§ 2. Basic rights
All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty,
to pursue happiness, to be deprived of any right because of race, religion,
national origin, or physical disability.
FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2.
ARTICLE VI. SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS
§ 1. Regulation of elections
All elections by the people shall be by direct and secret vote .....

§ 2. Electors
Every citizen of the United States who is at least eighteen years of age and who
is a permanent resident of the state, if registered as provided by law, shall be an
elector of the county where registered.

§ 3. Oath
Each eligible citizen upon registering shall subscribe the following: "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Florida, and that I am qualified
to register as an elector under the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida."

§ 4. Disqualifications
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be
mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration
of civil rights or removal of disability ....
FLA. CONST. art VI, §§ 1-4(a).
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ARTICLE X. MISCELLANEOUS
§ 12. Rules of construction
Unless qualified in the text the following rules of construction shall apply to this
constitution .....
(d) "Vote of the electors" means the vote of the majority of those voting on the
matter in an election, general or special, in which those participating are limited
to the electors of the governmental unit referred to in the text.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12.
OFFICERS THAT THE CONSTITUTION MAKES ELECTIVE
BY THE PEOPLE
1. Members, Florida Senate.
2. Members, Florida House of Representative.
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 15a, b.
3. Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Cabinet Members.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5 (statewide).
4. Justices of the Supreme Court (statewide) and judges of district courts of
appeal (merit retention elections).
5. Circuit and county court judges (i.e., trial judges).
6. State Attorneys.
7. Public Defenders.
FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10(a), (b), 17, 18.
8. County officers (county commissioners, sheriff, clerk of circuit court,
supervisor of elections, property appraiser, and tax collector).
9. Municipal legislative officers.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2(b).
10. Members of school boards.
11. Superintendents of Schools (voters may elect appointments by school boards).
FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4(a), 5.
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By contrast, the bases for the U.S. Constitution's right-to-vote are more
diffusely scattered among its provisions. The preamble, "We the people of
the United States... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America, '

3

is the only counterpart to Florida's "All

political power is inherent in the people." 4 Although the people themselves
never voted directly upon its adoption, the U.S. Constitution also purports
to derive from the sovereignty of the people. Apart from the preamble's
attestation of popular sovereignty, the text of the U.S. Constitution has

FLORIDA VOTERS ARE GUARANTEED THE RIGHT TO
APPROVE THESE ISSUES
1. Certain kinds of statutes enacted by the legislature (Special acts).
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
2. Certain ad valorem taxes on real property and tangible personal property.
3. Certain state bonds (i.e., instruments to borrow money).
4. Certain local bonds (i.e., instruments to borrow money).
FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 9, 11, 12.
5. Changing form of county government and transferring powers among local
governmental entities.
6. Local (county) option on legality of sale of intoxicating liquors.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ I(g), 3-5(a).
7. Convening a constitutional convention.
8. Amendments and revisions to the Florida Constitution.
FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4, 5.

23. U.S. CONST. pmbl. This provides that,
We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.

24. Id.
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little to say about the subject. What is said includes a directive" that the
people choose members of the House of Representatives and four
prohibitions26 against invidious infringements of the right-to-vote where it
does exist. The rest of the story was supplied by the U.S. Supreme Court
in is final Gore-Bush decision.
IV. DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Exactly what powers do courts possess to impose constitutional
standards on other branches of democratic governments formed under
written constitutions? One of the major pre-revolutionary gripes against
British colonial rule was the arrogance and overreaching decisions of
colonial judges.27 The Americans did not want to be ruled by judges. In an
attempt to quiet fears that an independent federal judiciary might similarly
usurp power from the popular branches of government, Alexander
Hamilton defended the judicial article ofthe proposed U.S. Constitution by
depicting thejudiciary as the "least dangerous" branch of government. Here
is Hamilton's famous statement:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the LEAST DANGEROUS to the political rights of the
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
25. U.S. CONST. § 2, cl. 1."The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
CHOSEN every second year by the people of the several states ...... Id.
26. The four prohibitions are, "The right of citizens of the United States TO VOTE shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I (universal male suffrage); "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § I (women suffrage);
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election
for president or vice president, for electors for president or vice president, or for
Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I (qualifications of electors); "The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § I (eighteen year
old voting rights).
27. This was touched upon in this complaint about George III lodged in the Declaration of
Independence: "He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. II
(U.S. 1776).
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them. The EXECUTIVE not only dispenses the honors, but holds
the SWORD of the community. The LEGISLATURE not only
commands the PURSE, but prescribes the RULES by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary,
on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse;
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society;
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but MERELY JUDGMENT; and
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments. 8
The Florida Supreme Court gives lip service to Hamilton's "merely
judgment" admonition, but its own statements and rulings often
aggressively exceed it. For example, that court has said:
Courts are created (1) to enforce the laws and (2) to resolve
disputes. Courts in the American legal system have a third distinct
and extremely important responsibility; that is to safeguard the
Constitution and protect individual rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton). What makes our legal system so different is
the ability of lawyers to challenge the constitutionality of
government conduct before a separate, independent judicial branch
of government.29
That Court has also endorsed this exhortation: "In Florida, our judiciary
likewise is the one branch that emphatically must protect the basic rights of
individuals against governmental overreaching. We guard liberty's
sanctuary. It is our greatest duty to the people of Florida."3
In keeping with this "greatest duty," the Florida Supreme Court deems
itself to be burdened with a "sacred trust confided to [itself] of preserving
the Constitution unimpaired."'" According to that court, this "sacred trust"
imposes a "painful duty" to invalidate any legislative act which "in its terms
abridges" a "hallowed" constitutional right or that is "subversive of the
principles of natural justice and against common reason and common

28. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

29. In re Amendments to Rules, 598 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla. 1992).
30. Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 113 (Fla. 1997) (Kogan, C.J., dissenting), cited with
approval inWhite v. State, 710 So. 2d 949,954 n.7 (Fla. 1998) ("As Chief Justice Kogan recently
reminded us, the genius of our federal and state constitutions is that they define basic rights that
neither the legislature nor executive branches can modify."), rev 'd on other grounds, sub nom.,
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 564-565 (1999).
31. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848).
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right."32 In short, the Florida Supreme Court deems itself to be clothed with
the "heroic" mission of reining in the other branches of government when
they fail to toe the constitutional line.
In vindicating this "sacred duty," the Florida Supreme Court has "not
hesitated to accomplish by judicial fiat what other divisions of government
have failed or refused to do in protecting, implementing, or enforcing
constitutional rights."33 At least once prior to the Gore-Bush dispute, a
litigant asked that court to order the Florida Legislature to enact a
particular law to protect constitutional rights. Although the Court refused
to do such a heroic act as that, it did flatly warn the Legislature that if it did
not enact an appropriate statute, then, in a proper case, the Court would
issue ajudicial decision prescribing rules to protect the constitutional rights
at stake.34 It was very much in the spirit of these brave conceptions of its
role and duty that the Florida Supreme Court entered the Gore-Bush affray.
By contrast, although it was the author of Marbury v. Madison, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ordinarily been a more faithful adherent to
Hamilton's admonition. With a few notable exceptions, it too employs the
Constitution primarily as a shield to block abusive governmental action and
is less prone than the Florida Supreme Court to wield the Constitution as
a sword to impose its version of constitutional policy directly upon the
other branches of government.35
V. THE POLITICAL STAKES IN THE GORE-BUSH DISPUTE
Despite its strongly and proudly possessed view of itself as the ultimate
guardian of the constitutional liberties of the people of Florida, the Florida
Supreme Court, as an institution, had little or nothing at stake in the
outcome of the Gore-Bush election dispute. The outcome would not affect
the tenure or status in office of any justice sitting on the Florida Supreme
Court. The structure and powers of that court and the selection and
retention of its members are controlled wholly by the Florida Constitution
and the people of Florida. Who should become the President of the United
States was simply irrelevant to these affairs.
By contrast, justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.36 After initial
appointment, absent impeachment, these justices serve for life or until

32. Id. Recognition is owed here, to Lord Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case [1610] (Dr.
Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610)).
33. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 687 (Fla.

1972).
34. Id. at 687-88.
35. Prime exceptions to this restraint are found in civil rights and voting rights cases,
including the year 2000 Gore-Bush decisions.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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voluntary relinquishment of office. 3" Hence, who was elected President
would no more directly affect the tenures of the incumbents on that court
than it did those of the Florida Supreme Court. But personal tenure was not
the whole picture; status was also at stake. If the office of Chief Justice
should fall vacant, the new President would be the person with authority to
nominate the successor.38 In short, the leadership position on the Court was
contingently at stake. In searching for a nominee, one may reasonably
assume that Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore would be attracted to entirely different
characters among eligible aspirants.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court is sharply and closely divided on
partisan grounds on a number of constitutional premises. These include the
powers of Congress, limits on the powers of the federal and state
governments, and the division of power between the United States and the
individual states. Several justices are of advanced years and may soon be
expected to depart by retirement or death; among them is Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Thus, the Gore-Bush disputants might reasonably predict that
the winner would appoint a new Chief Justice, and perhaps, one or more
additional justices in a four-year term of office, and even more, if a second
term should succeed it. The constitutional proclivities of this new line-up
ofjustices is likely to shape constitutional adjudication for years to come.
With all of this occupying their minds, the incumbent federal justices
may be presumed to have been "worried" in a quite literal sense about how
the outcome of the election would affect future constitutional adjudication
in the U.S. Supreme Court.39 By contrast, the Florida justices were not
directly burdened with these concerns. Consequently, although the federal
justices entered the Gore-Bush affray from the vantage point of a more
restrained orthodoxy in constitutional adjudication, they also entered it with
much more at stake in terms of institutional future. We may indulge a
presumption that the federal justices came to the task in a state of higher
internal agitation.
Courts are presumed to approach judicial disputes with strict partisan
neutrality. Nevertheless, no principle is free of corrosive agents, and, the
Gore-Bush dispute immersed the U.S. Supreme Court in a virulent
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39. Martha Barnett, Esq., of Tallahassee, Florida, was president of the American Bar
Association at the time of the election. She also is a graduate of the University of Florida College

of Law and a former student of this writer. Speaking at a University of Florida Law School
commencement ceremony in December 2000, Barnett told the audience that she had been engaged
in a telephone conversation with U.S. Supreme Court Justice O'Connor shortly before the
November 7, 2000 election. Barnett reported that Justice O'Connor extolled her along these lines,

"Martha, it's all going to be decided in Florida! You've got to get it right in Florida."
40. 1 include the word directly because one may also reasonably presume that the Florida
Justices do consider themselves to have a stake in federal constitutional adjudication.
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corrosive. In short, the Gore-Bush acid of practical politics attacked the
political neutrality of the federal justices much more aggressively than it
attacked the Florida justices.
Although all courts exhort lawyers not to questionjudicial motives, that
exhortation holds weakest when partisan politics is the only issue. In GoreBush, my willingness to accept judicial impartiality is suspended. I believe
that the performances of the two courts must be evaluated with this
difference in mind. In my view, the Florida Supreme Court wanted to
vindicate its self-proclaimed role as the ultimate protector of the
constitutional rights of the people of Florida by getting it right for the
people. By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court wanted to get it right for the
Court.4
VI. THE

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

A. The FloridaSupreme Court
As outlined above, the Florida election statutes mandated the Elections
Canvassing Commission to tabulate votes submitted by sixty-seven Florida
counties and certify a winner on the seventh day after the election, ignoring
votes not yet submitted. The Commission announced that it would follow
the plain mandates ofthe statutes.42 Gore partisans sued, challenging certain
vote tabulations and the Commission's interpretation of the statutory
certification statute.43 At that stage, without including unrecounted votes,
it appeared that Mr. Bush would be the certified winner. When asked to
decide whether the Commission must certify a winner on the seventh day,
the Florida Supreme Court vindicated its "sacred duty," stating:
The real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense but in realistic
terms, are the voters. They are possessed of the ultimate interest and
it is they whom we must give primary consideration.... The right
to vote is the right to participate; it is also the right to speak, but
more importantly the right to be heard.... By refusing to recognize
an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to vote for the
sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we
would in effect nullify that right.44

41. I am also quite willing to accept that members of the Court believed that getting it right

for the Court was synonymous with getting it right for the people.
42. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227-28 (Fla. 2000)
(citing Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)).
43. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
44. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227-28 (Fla. 2000)
(citing Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)).
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The Court continued: "The right of suffrage is the preeminent right
contained in the Declaration of Rights, for without this basic freedom all
' Thus, basing its opinion on its affirmation
others would be diminished."45
of this constitutional right-to-vote, but without an explicit textual source,
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the Commission must ignore the
plain wording of the election statute and must permit late returns of
recounted votes to be included in its final tabulation. Only if delay would
' would
"compromise the integrity of the electoral process"46
the Court's
order permit the Commission to reject late filed votes."7
Under this and subsequent orders," local Florida election officials
immediately commenced a massive hand recount of so-called "under
voted"49 ballots. The Court's order directed them to employ the recount
standard prescribed in the Florida election code; i.e., "a vote shall be
counted as a 'legal' vote if there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the
voter."' 50 As to rules of how to adjudge a voter's "clear indication," the

45. Id. at 1236.
46. Id. at 1237 ("(1) by precluding a candidate, elector, or taxpayer from contesting the
certification of an election pursuant to section 102.168; or (2) by precluding Florida voters from
participating fully in the federal electoral process.").
47. In reviewing this decision, a critic should be mindful that the right-to-vote claim here
was not made by an offended elector who had been excluded from the voting polls. Instead, it was
claimed on behalf of a candidate who sought to supplant the lawful election machinery with a
revised version, presumably more favorable to himself.
48. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
49. That is, those that the voting machinery had thrown out as not having properly identified
an intended presidential vote.
50. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000).
[W]e ordered the Circuit Court of Leon County to tabulate by hand 9000
contested Dade County ballots. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla.
2000). This Court further held that relief would require manual recounts in all
Florida counties where under votes existed which had not previously been subject
to manual tabulation. See id. at 1253, 1261-62. The standard we directed be
employed in the manual recount was the standard established by the Legislature
in the Florida Election Code, i.e., that a vote shall be counted as a "legal" vote
if there is a "clear indication of the intent of the voter." See id. at 1262 (citing
FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2000)). The "intent of the voter" standard adopted by
the Legislature was the standard in place as of November 7, 2000, and a more
expansive ruling would have raised an issue as to whether this Court would be
substantially rewriting the Code after the election, in violation of article II,
section 1, clause 2 of the United States Constitution and § 3 U.S.C. 5 (1994).
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Court would give no hint.5 Ironically, the Florida court's strict adherence
to this one statutory standard, i.e., an unexplained "intent of the voter,"
while elaborating another,52 incited the U.S. Supreme Count to quash Mr.
Gore's quest to vindicate the Florida constitutional right-to-vote to gain his
hoped-for victory.
In sum, the Florida Supreme Court distilled a substantive right-to-vote
from various premises embedded in the Florida Constitution53 and
authorized partisans ofa disappointed candidate to invoke this right-to-vote
and demand a recount even after the time prescribed by the Legislature has
expired. This was a mighty feat of constitutional embroidery.
B. The United States Supreme Court
Mr. Bush again sought relief in the U.S. Supreme Court. He argued that
the Florida recount order failed to prescribe a uniform standard for
evaluating disputed ballots, thus permitting arbitrary and unconstitutional
variation among the decisions of local officials in many counties. 54Taking
Mr. Bush's bait, a majority of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
rendered this decision:
The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote
for electors for the President of the United States unless and until
the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to
implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral
College.... History has now favored the voter, and in each of the
several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors.
When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its
people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the
equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to
each voter....
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation
of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its

51. Most likely, the Court was concerned that its prescription of a counting methodology at
this point in the process would free Congress of its legislative commitment to accept state electoral
court submissions when Congress exercised its ultimate authority to choose among competing
slates that might be presented by a state.
52. That is, whether or not the Elections Canvassing Commissions must certify a winner on
the seventh day.
53. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 (Fla. 2000) ("The right to vote is the right to
participate; it is also the right to speak, but more importantly, the right to be heard.").
54. This argument ignored the far greater differences among the inherent reliability of the
various different balloting and counting systems in place within the counties.
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exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
person's vote over that of another....
Upon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point,
it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance
with the requirements of equalprotection and due process without
substantialadditionalwork It would require not only the adoption
(after opportunity for argument) of adequate statewide standards for
determining what is a legal vote, and practicable procedures to
implement them, but also orderly judicial review of any disputed
matters that might arise....
Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the
December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have
discussed, we reverse the judgment ofthe Supreme Court of Florida
ordering a recount to proceed. 5
In condemning the Florida statutory standard on equal protection
grounds, this order ignored provisions of Florida law requiring public
decision-making, partisan observers,56 and judicial participation in the
recounting process." In short, the Court ignored the fact that the law was
carefully designed to avoid partisan, arbitrary and capricious decisions. It
also ignored the fact that this same "intent of the voter" standard had been
used to evaluate hand-marked ballots without perceived constitutional
impediment for many decades before machine balloting came into the
picture. But that was then, and this is now.
The U.S. Supreme Court did follow the lead of the Florida Supreme
Court in holding that a candidate could invoke, post-election, the
electorates' right-to-vote to challenge the structure of a state's election
laws. But, what the federal right-to-vote required Florida election officials
to do was drastically different. The Florida court had held that a recount
must occur to vindicate the right, and the U.S. Supreme Court held the
recount must not occur. 8 In that particular conflict, the Florida voters'
federal right-to-vote prevailed over the same voters' state right.
Almost exactly half the voters were made happy by the outcome.

55. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05, 110 (2000) (emphasis added).

56. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(7) (2000).
57. The work is undertaken by county canvassing boards, which are comprised of the county
supervisor of elections, a county judge serving as the presiding officer, and a county commissioner.
FLA. STAT. § 102.141(l) (2000).
58. For additional discussion of this point, see Mark Tushnet, The History and Future of
Bush v. Gore, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 23-36 (2001).
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VII. EPILOGUE
The final decision of the U.S. Supreme Court ended Mr. Gore's election
hopes, and in time, Mr. Bush was sworn in as President of the United
States. I once thought that both the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court made decisions that got in the way of determining the true
expression of Florida voters. I am no longer persuaded that the Florida
Supreme Court was guilty of that failing. Instead, I believe it tried too hard;
it over-extended the electors' "right-to-vote" in an election conflict that
was too closely divided to be resolved by recounting even a large number
of rejected ballots.
As to the ballots in question, no one advanced a credible argument that
the State had set out to hinder voters in the exercise of the franchise.59
Furthermore, the Florida court grossly undervalued the efforts of ninetynine plus percent of the voters who voted exactly as they wished. Instead,
the Court fixated upon the foibles of a very small percentage of voters who
simply were not prepared to exercise their franchises effectively. A major
share of the blame should be heaped upon the political parties and their
candidates. They paid too little attention to examining proposed ballots and
preparing voters in advance of election day. Similarly, many disappointed
voters failed to prepare themselves adequately before going to the polls.
Election officialdom might have adopted a less error-prone system, but
failing to cater to a minuscule fraction of unprepared voters can hardly be
deemed to be an infringement of the right-to-vote.
The Florida court also failed to acknowledge that the situation was one
in which its orders could not produce the "true winner." No court order
could produce a vote tabulation that accurately reflected the collective
subjective state of mind of six million voters in a razor's-edge contest.
Because the race ended in a virtual dead heat, the Florida court would have
done well to have affirmed Judge Sauls' judgment," which was that Mr.
Gore had failed to prove a basis for the relief he was seeking.6
The most generous evaluation of the work of the U.S. Supreme Court
is to speculate that it would never have been tempted into the affray if the
Florida Supreme Court had merely applied Florida law as it stood on the
morning of election day. Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court could have
declined Mr. Bush's attempt to invoke review of the Florida court's initial
order, then by giving county election officials more time to submit

59. Several other actions challenged the propriety of administrative actions, but all were
unsuccessful. Other actions raised questions of official improprieties, but none proved to be
successful. See, e.g., Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000); Jacobs
v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000).
60. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262, 1271 (Fla. 2000).
61. Id.
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recounted votes than the Florida election code seemed to permit. After all,
the U.S. Constitution assigns state legislatures unreviewable power to
direct how presidential electors are to be appointed,62 and assigns Congress
unreviewable power to choose the President6 3 from the aggregation of state
electors so chosen.64 Given this federal constitutional division of authority,
the Court might have demurred stating, "It is for the States to determine a

62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1,cl.2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . .
63.
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant
of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person
voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as
President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of
votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate; - the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted; - the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall
be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the
highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President,
the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot,the President.
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of
all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives
shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President
shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability
of the President. - The person having the greatest number of votes as
Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from
the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President;
a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But
no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to
that of Vice-President of the United States.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
64. Congress also sets the days upon which state electors are chosen and upon which the
state electors then vote in the states. "The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the
Electors, and which Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
2.
throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,cl.
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slate of state electors and it is for Congress to decide whether or not to
count them.""5 Instead, in the guise of its expressed uncertainty as to
whether the Florida court had thought its own decision was mandated by
federal law," it resorted to its jurisdiction" to review a decision of a state's

65. The Court indeed paid lip service to this approach in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104
(2000), noting "the State legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is
plenary."
66. The federal law in question were the statutes found in 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) in which
Congress has indicated what rules it will follow in counting the reports of electors submitted by
the States. Foremost among these was this "Safe Harbor" provision pertaining to which set of
electors Congress will credit in the event of some conflict in state submissions:
Determination of controversy as to appointment of electors
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by
judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been
made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at
least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive,
and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the
Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the
electors appointed by such State is concerned.
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). The relevance of this statute would be limited to ascertaining whether the
Florida Legislature might have intended to achieve in regard to satisfying the safe harbor
requirement and not as a mandate to the States.
67. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The fundamental source ofjurisdiction
is the U.S. Constitution, which provides in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of
another State; - between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, 2. Congress has executed this provision by providing the U.S.
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts, as follows:
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highest court that rests upon an interpretation of federal law or the U.S.
Constitution. This "uncertainty ' 68 empowered the U.S. Supreme Court to
vacate the decision of the Florida court and remand with directions to
clarify. 69
Thereafter, the Florida court entered a second order reaffirming that the
Commission must accept late-recounted ballot returns; it also directed
county election officials to conduct a recount to ascertain the "intention of
the voter"70 in regard to disputed ballots. 7' Announcing new guidelines at
this stage of the process could be seen as a revision of the statutory law as
it stood on election day, thereby threatening Congress's "safe harbor"
guarantee to accept a slate of state electors chosen by existing law. Fearing
this, the Florida court deliberately declined to prescribe new non-statutory

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which
a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn
in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up
or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission
held or authority exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term "highest court of a State" includes
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
68. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) ("After reviewing
the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, we find 'that there is considerable uncertainty as to the
precise grounds for the decision."').
69. Id. at 70.
70. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261 (Fla. 2000), applying the "clear indication of the
intent of the voter" standard prescribed by section 101.5614(5) of the Florida Statutes.
71. Id.
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guidelines to determine voter intent.72 No doubt, the Florida court also
intended to rest its decision solely on Florida law and not federal mandates,
thus closing the door on further review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Much to the chagrin of Mr. Gore's supporters (and probably the
members of the Florida Supreme Court), this "clarification" did not
persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to bow out of the Florida controversy.
Instead, upon Mr. Bush's second application, that court dropped its own
right-to-vote bombshell. 7' No longer having "lack of clarity" as its
jurisdiction handhold, the U.S. Supreme Court seized upon its own version
of a constitutional "right-to-vote," as follows:
The Florida Supreme Court has ordered that the intent of the
voter be discerned from such ballots. For purposes of resolving the
equal protection challenge, it is not necessary to decide whether the
Florida Supreme Court had the authority under the legislative
scheme for resolving election disputes to define what a legal vote is
and to mandate a manual recount implementing that definition. The
recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions ofthe
Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for
non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the
fundamental right. Florida's basic command for the count of legally
cast votes is to consider the "intent of the voter. ' 74 This is
unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle.
The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure
its equal application. The formulation of uniform rules to determine
intent based on these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we
conclude, necessary ....
The want of those rules here has led to unequal evaluation of
ballots in various respects . . . . As seems to have been

72. See 3 U.S.C. § 5. The Florida court indicated its intention not to rupture the safe harbor,
as follows:
Based on this Court's status as the ultimate arbiter of conflicting Florida law, we
conclude that our construction of the above statutes results in the formation of no
new rules of state law but rather results simply in a narrow reading and
clarification of those statutes, which were enacted long before the present
election took place. We decline to rule more expansively in the present case, for
to do so would result in this Court substantially rewriting the Code. We leave
that matter to the sound discretion of the body best equipped to address it, the
Legislature.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1291 (Fla. 2000).
73. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
74. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd., 772 So. 2d at 1261.
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acknowledged at oral argument, the standards for accepting or
rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to
county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to
another.75
This novel equal protection analysis has been controversial and the
subject of extensive commentary, which I will not repeat. What this ironical
decision incontestably did was to end the Florida election dispute and Mr.
Gore's election hopes. The Florida voters' federal right-to-vote, favoring
Mr. Bush at this particular stage of the contest, trumped the same voters'
Florida right-to-vote, favoring whom we will never know.
What does all this mean for the future of the Republic and, perhaps, for
democratic government "of the people, by the people and for the people?"
Perhaps this was best expressed by Florida Supreme Court Justice Shaw
who concluded:
I commend the public officials, employees, and volunteers ofthis
state - each election supervisor, judge, court clerk, board member,
and all the others - who worked tirelessly in a star-crossed effort
to count every vote. I commend the people of our state and nation
who looked faithfully to the courts to interpret and apply the law. I
also commend Vice President Gore for persevering in the labor of
Sisyphus; each time he attempted to comply with the Code, he was
forced to begin anew. And I commend President-elect Bush for
remaining stalwart in the face of charges of suppressing the truth
(i.e., ofobstructing the counting of ballots) and disenfranchising the
voters of this state. And finally, I especially commend the other
justices of this court, each of whom approached this case with a
sworn resolve to be objective, honorable, and fair.
Our nation has been through an ordeal, but we have learned from
the experience. At this point, I know one thing for certain: The basic
principles of our democracy are intact.76

75. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06.
76. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 529-30 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring). Shaw also
stated:
Admittedly, the present scenario is surreal: All the king's horses and all the
king's men could not get a few thousand ballots counted. The explanation,
however, is timeless. We are a nation of men and women and, although we aspire
to lofty principles, our methods at times are imperfect.
First, although the untabulated Florida ballots may hold the truth to the
presidential election, we still - to this day - cannot agree on how to count
those ballots fairly and accurately. In fact, we cannot even agree on if they should
be counted. Second, although the right to vote is paramount, we routinely
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I think Judge Shaw is correct about the intactness of our democracies.
Thoughtful voters may be understandably confused about the conflicting
meanings of their constitutional rights-to-vote.

installed outdated and defective voting systems and tabulating equipment at our
polls prior to the present election. And finally, although the rule of law is
supreme, the key legal text in this case - i.e., the Florida Election Code - is
fraught with contradictions and ambiguities, and the key legal ruling- i.e., the
United States Supreme Court's final decision in Bush v. Gore, . .. - was
denigrated.., and rejected by nearly half the members of that Court.
Id. at 529-30.

